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Introduction
This essay is characterized by perspectives and interests 
that are manifold. It has, however, a unifying theme that may 
summarily denoted as "politics and administration revisited".
As is well known, the relationship between politics and adminis­
tration has been, and is, one among the constant concerns of pol­
itical science: this essay is largely constructed as an analysis 
and an evaluation of how the ways in which that relationship ope­
rates affect both the viability of party government and the gov- 
ernability of the complex polities of today.
The approach adopted here, then, is meant to broaden the 
scope of most discussions about politics and administration 
which, with a few exceptions, have been the province of specia­
lists in the discipline of political science: by this I mean that 
such discussions have been concerned with the analysis of an ad­
mittedly important segment of the political system, but seldom 
have tried to explore its implications for the performance of the 
whole system. On the other hand, studies centered on the issues 
of either party government or governability, while taking into 
consideration a host of societal and cultural factors to account 
for variance in, and problems of, performance, give marginal, if 




























































































Granted, then, that a large number of factors condition the 
performance of political parties and affect governability, public 
administration is here singled out as one, and crucially important, 
among such factors. As was pointed out at the outset, doing so in­
volves tackling the traditional issue of the relationship between 
politics and administration: the conceptualization of such relation­
ship, however, has undergone many a Revision in a literature that 
spans a very long period. I am going to show that even the most
updated revisions do not succeed in satisfactorily explaining the 
complex interplay of policy-making activities undertaken by pol- 
tical parties and elected personnel on the one hand, and profes­
sional administrators on the other.
In order to arrive at a more satisfactory and comprehensive 
approach, a critical survey of existing conceptualizations and of 
the empirical circumstances that have prompted their formation is 
needed. This endeavor, as will be seen, entails the development 
of both analytical and historical arguments: in the following sec­
tions an effort is made to present alternative definitions of
the problem in as orderly a fashion as possible, with the aim of 
developing a new, more complete and explanatory conceptual frame­
work. However, as doing so involves the exploration of empirical 
situations that - being historical - are sequentially arranged, 




























































































1. Bureaucracy and Party Government.
In the Western liberal and scholarly traditions, 
bureaucracy and democracy are perceived as being antithetic, 
antagonistic, and mutually exclusive or, to put it less 
bluntly, bureaucracy and bureaucratization are perceived 
as being inimical to democracy. The Weberian scenario 
Whereby the modern world, its social and economic life, 
will be dominated and controlled by large and impersonal 
bureaucracies stifling individual enterprise and imperilling 
freedom has been with us for a long time.
Thus, it is not surprising that according to democratic 
theory the making of politically relevant authoritative 
decisions ought to be the exclusive province of elected 
officials and no decisional discretion ought to be left 
to professional and institutionalized administrative 




























































































themselves to the mere execution of those decisions.
During the 19th Century the Western world developed 
two radically different, - indeed alternative and mutually 
exclusive -, doctrinal and operational approaches to 
the problem of how to control the bureaucracy.
In the United States, political agencies were to control 
the bureaucracy by negating that administration could 
be kept separate from politics, by making public administration 
continuous with elective political organs and by affirming 
the political nature of administrative action. In other 
words, by istituting the spoils system.
In Continental Europe, where the liberal-representative 
regimes emerged at mid-century had inherited solidly 
articulated professional bueaucracies from the ancien 
régime, the normative theory was developed introducing 
the principle of separation between politics and 
administration. As is well known, the functional
correlates of that theory are the twin principles 
of the political neutrality of the civil
service and the purely executive (non decisional) role 
of public administration. These principles, which were 
treated as validated empirical propositions by European 
doctrine, that is as correct descriptions of reality, 
were adopted in America too at the turn of the - century, 
when the merit system began its course, after the - 
dismal administrative record of the spoils system had 
begun to imperil the very legitimacy of democratic 1




























































































as empirically tested propositions but, rather, as moral 
imperatives which, if adequately pursued, would have 
made administration a truly neutral and "scientific" 
technique (Goodnow, Wilson).
We know that things have not quite worked in this 
way. In fact, modern political science has disowned 
the conception that has been just summarized as 
formalistic and axiological: administrative action is
no longer defined as politically neutral, nor are 
bureaucratic agencies any longer maintained to be the 
passive and docile instruments of elective institutions. 
The position now generally accepted is that professional 
civil servants share in policy-making and, in doing 
so, start from ideological and/or political value-premises 
which might, or might not, coincide with those adhered 
to by the personnel of elective institutions.
If, then, the theory positing the separation between 
politics and administration has been so thoroughly 
abandoned, why do we continue to consider as relevant 
analyses and discussions revolving around the couple 
"bureaucracy and democracy"? Because, obviously, this 
is a central part of democratic theory, and plays a- 
fundamental role in those political cultures which have 
accepted and absorbed the values and institutions of 
constitutional and representative government. Tha -idea 
of a separation between politics and administration 




























































































systems (constitutional and representative), and a.
negligible and marginal one in others (authoritarian 
and traditional). Even though the political neutra­
lity and the merely executive role of public
administration have been invalidated as descriptive
statements, as ĵ s propositions, and shown to be formalistic*myths, they however retain much strength and appeal 
as normative statements, as ought to propositions. They, 
in sum, represent permanent values, desirable and essential 
objectives in democratic and constitutional polities...
The crucial role played by such values is made even more 
apparent as we turn our attention to the party government 
model (taken here as the one which is ideally fitted to articul­
ate democratic theory in the context of mass democracy). Even 
though one finds many a shade of opinion in the literature, 
there seems to be a general agreement on the point, as Sartori 
puts it, (1976: ix) that "Parties are the central intermediate 
and intermediary structures between society and government". 
Descriptively, the functions that political parties perform 
can be divided into two main categories: those that can be 
characterized as inputs, such as mobilization and channelling 
of support, formulations of alternatives, recruitment and replace­
ment of leadership (with which this essay is not concerned).
And those functions having to do with outputs, performed by poli­
tical parties when in power, such as formation and implementation 
of policy and control over public administration, (which are 




























































































What has been said so far implies that party government is
strongly associated with a view of democracy whereby the political
system is made democratic by the electoral and decisional roles
of parties (Ranney). As the events and the literature of
*the approximately last twenty-five years have pointed out, how­
ever, this normative idealization of the role of parties has been 
called into discussion: the governability of industrial and post­
industrial societies and, therefore, the ability of parties and 
party governments to cope with contemporary problems have become 
the subjects of serious concern (Crozier, 1975) . For instance, 
the observation that bureaucrats frequently act as independent 
decision makers or in concert with organized interests, has cast 
doubts on whether parties are actually in control of policy. This 
train of reasoning has quite logically led many an observer to ask 
the question whether political parties have the capacity to per­
form the functions that both normatively and descriptively have been 
assigned to them.
At this point, the following question arises: having focussed 
our attention, both descriptively as well as normatively, on 
functions performed by political parties such as policy formation 
and execution, which conditions must obtain if we are to speak of 
party government? Two seem to stand out: the first is that all 
significant policy decisions are made by people chosen in partisan 
elections or else by those whom they appoint. In other words,
"the party government model requires that party based leaders be 
able effectively to control the bureaucracy and other public or 




























































































That political parties control effectively public adminis­
tration, however, is not a sufficieht condition. Party government, 
if it wants to retain legitimacy, must also exhibit some "problem 
solution capacity", consisting of several elements, among which 
one enumerates "the capacity to get a specific policy implemented ", 
"the ability to frame policies that will produce the desired (by 
the policy maker) results", and "the ability to choose the 'right' 
aims or policies". (Katz: 25-27. Emphasis added.) In this volume, 
the essay which is specifically concerned with problem solution 
in politics, drives the point home even more forcefully. In fact, 
"democratic party government is likely to persist if, and only if:
(a) the more important societal problems are put on the agenda, 
i.e. turned into policy problems, and (b) the more important poli­
cy problems are solved in an acceptable way and, (c) the more im­
portant political problems are solved in an acceptable way". (Sjo- 
blom: 46. Emphasis added).
Now, the second condition of party government that has been 
just presented, (and particularly that, among its components, iden­
tified by Katz as policy implementation, and by Sjoblom as accepta­
ble solution of policy problems)', can be met in the complex polities 
of today only by resorting to the professional know-how and techni­
cal expertise usually associated with an institutionalized and per­
manent civil service. This latter condition, however, is at least 
partially incompatible with the former, which calls for direct con­
trol by parties over administration for, as it has been stated ter­
sely, "recognizing that a permanent bureaucracy is an essential fea­
ture of all modern governments, this [[the firs-0 condition is vio­
lated to the extent that bureaucrats exercise independent policy 




























































































This antilogy leads us back to the two basic patterns of 
administrative organization which have emerged from the hist­
orical experience of Western political systems: on the one hand, 
the spoils system, with its attendant inefficiency, corruption 
and potential for delegitimation, which, nevertheless, maximizes 
the probability that elected personnel control the bureaucracy.
On the other hand, the continental bureaucratic model which, while 
fostering expertise and technical know-how, has frequently seen 
its allegedly neutral cadres exercising independent policy making 
authority.
To recapitulate: in the context of the modernized and com­
plex polities of the present time, the idea of separation between 
politics and administration, (as formulated in the 19th century) 
and the correlative principles of the neutrality and instrumentality 
of administrative action are neither descriptively valid nor emp­
irically tenable. In all Western political systems, bureaucracies 
loom large over the political arena and have been exerting a more 
and more pervasive influence on decision-making. And yet, in pol­
ities where party government is conceived as the sole, or main, 
policy-making agency, those ideas and principles are taken to be 





























































































Apparently, we are faced here with what looks like an in­
tractable problem of the either-or kind. In short compass: (a)
party government must have direct control over policy making;
(b) effective policy making can take place only when a problem 
solution capacity exists; (c) such capacity may be obtained only 
by resorting to a permanent professional bureaucracy, whose con­
trollability by political parties should be insured via a neat 
and rigid separation between policy, and administration; (d) the 
theory of separation has been invalidated by the empirical obser­
vation whereby bureaucrats tend to act as independent decision 
makers.
I am going to argue that the apparent intractability of the 
problem depends largely on the fact that the theory of separation 
between policy and administration has been dismissed too lightly, 
as being both heuristically invalid and operationally inpractica- 
ble. The policy-administration dichotomy, in other words, is trea­
ted in the modern literature of political science as being false, 
and as always having being false. This happens because the theory 
has been tackled from a static perspective, that is without paying 
attention to the circumstances that prompted its original formu­
lation. But, as such circumstances are historical, the analytical 
approach that one wants to adopt must be sensitive to the diachro­
nic dimension.
In pursuing this line of reasoning, the case will be made that 
the theory was not false when first enunciated, and this can be done 
by calling attention to the social, economic, and political conditions 
prevailing when and where the theory was originally formulated. It 
will then be shown that, much later, the theory was empirically 
invalidated when the conditions which prompted its fromulation no 
longer existed. Finally, by means of an analytical investigation 
of the organizational properties of contemporary administrative 
structures, and of the rational requisites for different types of 
decisional processes, it will be argued that given the appropriate 




























































































what I am doing here can be seen as an effort to rehabilitate 
the policy-administration dichotomy. (1).
The relationship between politics and administration (and, 
more specifically, the constraints that such relationship imposes 
on the realizability of party government) is here treated as our 
dependent variable. Our independent variables will be more pre­
cisely identified as our argument unfolds in the following pages: 
they are constituted by a set of factors - cultural, structural, 
and behavioral - that either maximize or minimize the probability 
that the two conditions for party government which we have stipu­
lated (party control over administration and problem solution 
capacity) are actually met. For the time being, they can be 
expressed as questions: (a) which factors help in explaining the
degree to which a bureaucratic system exerts an autonomous power 
uncontrolled and/or uncontrollable by elected officials? (b) 
which factors explain whether a bureaucratic system has the cap­
acity for effective policy performance?
In the following sections, approaches to, and conceptions of 
the policy-administration dichotomy are critically reviewed; a 
number of theoretical relationships among historical, structural, 
and heuristic dimensions having to do with policy performance are 
outlined; and hypotheses (that might be tested in future research) 





























































































2. The Performance of Western Political Systems: the
Bureaucratic Factor.
After the Second World War, a disquieting syndrome
- whose intensity has been growing with the passing*of time - has become apparent in modernized and 
constitutional Western political systems, even though 
to different degrees in different countries: the inability 
of political .parties and party systems, (and of the public 
institutions that they are supposed to activate and 
operate), both to adapt to the challenges posed by rapid 
socio-economic-political change, and to govern effectively 
Numerous conditions have been pinpointed and offered 
as hypotheses potentially capable of explaining that 
syndrome, mainly focussed on the relationship between 
party system and society. Thus, attention has been 
directed to whether the party system is competitive 
or not; to whether parties operate in a homogeneous 
or fragmented cultural context, and to the way in which 
this affects modes of mobilization and the functions 
of interest articulation and interest aggregation.' 
Frequently, the malfunctioning of institutions charged 
with policy-making and policy-execution is treated as 
a dependent variable, to be seen as a consequence of 
the failure of the party system to adequately process 
diverse and conflictful demands. In other words,- 
governability, or the lack of it, would be a function 
of largely cultural factors.




























































































leads to an approach somewhat divergent from the one 
just outlined: while the influence of political culture 
on the performance of institutions is taken for granted, 
one should also take into account that institutions have 
properties of their own which affect policy-making and. 
policy-execution pretty much indipendently. As Bichard 
Rose aptly puts it "the discussion about 'ingovernabi1ity1 
is concerned with the ability of government to influence 
the larger environment of which it is a part as well 
as its citizens. While compliance follows logically 
from popular support for a regime, the effectiveness 
of a government in controlling the environment does 
not necessarilly follow" (Rose: 5).
The trust behind this argument is that political 
systems may be encountering problems in performing 
effectively regardless of their prevailing ideological 
and/or cultural compositum and that, therefore, some 
light might be thrown on those problems by focussing 
on institutional functioning. This is made more plausible 
by the circumstance that the current debate about 
governability tends to include all the modernized Western 
political systems, which are thus depicted as sharing, 
common problems and characteristics in the area of 
governmental performance. For instance, in a redent
discussion of the problems of 
party government, Wildenmann sets forth an extensive 
catalogue of constraints, conditions and challenges : 
that, in the course of recent decades, have made governing 
a difficult and frustrating endeavor in Western Europe: 




























































































others are definitely structural and institutional,
as the following quotations make clear:
"there is a diversification... creating
a division of responsibility not
in conformity with traditional models*of government".
"...the task of government, including 
the implementation of policies, seems 
to be confronted with almost unsolvable 
problems" "...There seems to be a 
loss of control over governmental 
and administrative decision-making 
bodies, and a growing inability of 
party government to carry out organized 
and... legitimized policies..."
"The ability of decision making bodies 
to solve fundamental policy questions 
has to be assessed" (Wildenmann:
7,10,16)
Our attention is here directed to a familiar picture: 
"old" governmental systems are forced to adapt to new 
requirements, that is those requirements largely generated 
by "the well known increased intervention of governments 
in the allocation and/or redistribution of the G.N.P. 
in connection with the evolution of the welfare state" 
(Wildenmann: 9) as well as by the new economic, managerial 
and industrial functions performed by the modern state. 
More specifically, our attention is directed to those 





























































































These two terms should be denoted more precisely 
at this point. When we say that governments are overloaded* 
we do not imply a merely quantitative question, i . é . , 
the functional load of governments is greater but, also, - 
and preeminently, a qualitative question, i.e., the 
load is not only greater, but different from what it 
used to be, thus burdening and straining policy-making 
structures with task-domains that they were not meant 
to tackle originally.
The concept of overcomplexity can be denoted similary: 
in the words of Richard Rose, "Because organizations 
'institutionalize' decisions from the past, they dò 
not ...adapt well to changing...conditions. The relative 
rigidity of government institutions intensifies 
overcomplexity, for some activities of government will 
reflect decisions made in circumstances no longer appropriate 
Yet government agencies continue to move forward, propelled 
by inertia commitments" (Rose: 8).
What, in other words, the notions of overload and 
overcomplexity both suggest can be succinctly described 
as follows; first, poor policy performance is a function 
of the growing incongruence between the governmental 
institutional machinery (notably public administration)- 
and the new tasks (of intervention into the economy 
and society) being undertaken by the political system; -*--
second, poor policy performance is not so much a question : ...
of inefficiency, that is of an unsatisfactory ratio* 
between inputs and outputs but, rather, a question of ‘ : 
ineffectiveness, that is of an unsatisfactory* ratio: ._!• 
of expected outcomes to actual outcomes; thirdj structural- ; 




























































































factors leading to poor policy-performance, both per
se (because of an inadequate fit between structures
and functions) and as premises for decision-making
(because different structures designed to pursue the
same goals may do so with different decisional styles■*
leading to more or less satisfactory outcomes).
These last three points are taken here as working 
assumptions: they have the nature of hypotheses which
need to be tested empirically in a systematic fashion, 
but since some empirical and historical data are available 
as hypotheses they exhibit some prima facie plausibility.
3. Structural vs. Attitudinal Conditions of Policy- 
Performance .
The central assumption of this essay is that the 
performance of the political-administrative system can 
and must be explained chiefly in the light of structural 
variables and modes of decision-making. However,: as 
will be seen, this is still a moot question in. the 
political science literature. A compressed summaryl of: 
this issue is in order at this point.
In recent decades, constitutional and economically 





























































































of largely common features: a) governments have been
acquiring a larger and larger number of functions to
perform in their societies and economies; b) concomitantly,
public bureaucracies have increased in size and have
expanded their participation in policy-making; c) at«
the same time, the performance of the political and 
administrative system has become less than satisfactory; 
in any event, it has proved to be inferior vis-à-vis 
rising expectations, and incapable of processing the 
diverse and growing demands articulated by social and 
economic groups.
An issue which looms large in this area is 
well summed up by the following question:
to what extent are policy decisions 
(as formulated in elective organs and political parties) 
influenced by professional administrators?
For a long time, political science has accepted 
conceptions, originated from legal axiology, and most 
specifically set forth by such scholars as Wilson and 
Goodnow, which define administrative action as politically 
neutral, and maintain that bureaucratic agencies are 
the docile instruments of elected bodies. This point 
of view has been taken from granted up to relatively 
recent times. This has happened, interestingly enough, 
regardless of the ideological propensities of individual : 
scholars: just to cite some classics, the positions
of progressive writers like F. Neumann and C. Wright. 
Mills, and those of conservative thinkers like L. von 




























































































the negligible impact of bureaucracies on policy-making.
Now the situation is totally different: after the
Appleby,pioneering work of authors like^ Kingsley and Lipset, 
there is now a vast body of literature whose position 
-generally accepted and validated empirically- is that 
higher civil servants take part in policy-making and, 
in so doing, start from value-premises which might, 
or might not, coincide with those adhered to by the 
nation's elected representatives and in-herent in the 
party system.
The view that professional administrators conduct 
their business sustained by coherent and explicit systems 
of ideological beliefs has been empirically demonstrated 
beyond doubt. In a recent and monumental work, which 
applies sophisticated behavioral procedures to opinion 
data from seven Western political systems, important 
analogies and similarities between the ideological posi­
tions of politicians and bureaucrats have been identified: 
"...both types of policymaker typically express 
ideologically consistent points of view on the basic 
issues of social change and government activism that 
have structured politics in the West during this century. 
Bureaucrats may display a more inductive, less philosophical 
approach to pubblic affairs than politicians...but this 
does not mean that their positions on fundamental 
ideological issues are any less coherent", (Aberbach, : 
Putnam and Rockman: 130).
In the literature which pursues this line of inquiry - 




























































































whereby a high correlation exists between the overall 
performance of the administrative system and the political 
attitudes of professional bureaucrats (as well as those 
demographic factors that more directly influence political 
socialization).
A conclusion frequently arrived at from this position 
is that where we observe a high congruence between the 
values prevailing in the political system and the attitudes 
of the higher civil service, the performance of the 
administrative system is satisfactory, whereas the 
opposite is true when the values of the political system 
and the attitudes of the civil service are incongruent, 
antagonistic and/or incompatible. (Putnam). An implication
of this is that effective party government (as was defined 
at the outset) would be largely a function of the political 
attitudes and ideological profiles of higher civil servants
The assumption behind the approach being- 
discussed (i. e. , that the political attitudes of the 
bureaucracy as a social group explain and/or predict 
their professional and institutional behavior) revolves 
around a central concept, that of the responsiveness 
of the civil service as contrasted with the traditional- 
and legalistic concept of impartiality or political 
neutrality of the professional administrator. As j,X>. - 
Kingsley wrote: "...the essence of bureaucratic
responsability in the modern State is to be sought, 
not in the presumed and largely fictitious impartiality 
of the officials, but in the strength of their-committment 
to the purposes that State is undertaking - to serve" 
(Kingsley: 274). .
In a more recent discussion, Putnam has defined 




























































































positively, with readiness, faithfulness and efficacy, 
to the needs and demands of society and of its political 
representatives, and to show, at the same time, more 
concern with programmes and problems than with procedure 
and rules; and the same author points out that the 
political opinions and values upheld by bureaucrats 
are a most important indicator of their proclivity to 
act responsively.
That behavioral studies of administrative action 
emphasize responsiveness as a central concept makes, 
of course, perfectly sound sense in methodological terms, 
as responsiveness may be gauged quite effectively on 
the basis of attitudinal data. The substantive results 
obtained by such studies are extremely valuable, moreover, 
as they increase and systematize knowledge about elites 
sind their relationship to the values of the political 
system. A different appraisal must be made, however, 
when, either implicitly or explicitly, a relationship between 
responsiveness and effectiveness is postulated: the
empirical evidence made available so far does not warrant 
such a conclusion. More specifically, I contend that 
the relationship between the political responsiveness 
of the civil servants and the effectiveness of administrative
action is far from being unilinear.^
............. .. . . . .... -  -  -------------------- ~
The political attitudes of higher civil servants constitute 
a set of variables which -of great interest per se- 
do explain only a part of the performance of the 
administrative system. More precisely, while such attitudes 




























































































bordering on or leading to regime- transitions,- they 
do not explain much (taken alone), if we are interested 
in understanding administrative action and policy 
performance in more or less stable contexts.
On the contrary, a different kind of variable is 
centrally relevant in the latter connection, which is 
usually neglected or downplayed by studies investigating 
the relationship between politics and administration 
and the decisional role of professional bureaucrats.
I define this kind of variable as the organizational 
properties of administrative structures qua structures.
An analysis and interpretation of policy-performance 
centered on the study of organizational properties 
implies that administrative behavior and processes shall 
be considered in the light of structural determinants 
(Thompson: 6-9). The concept of structural determinants
as utilized in this discussion is defined quite broadly: 
it includes not only the formal features of administrative 
organization, but also factors of a cultural and/or 
ideological nature, such as the values which, deeply 
implanted in formal structures and procedures act as 
decision-premises and affect thoroughly the' processes 
of institutional socialization of bureaucratic actors 
(Blau: 224-331). : J - . -
An analytical treatment of organizational properties 
as conditions of policy-performance, and an inquiry 
of the conceptual arguments supporting the approach 
suggested here are developed in Sections 4 and 5 according 
to the following outline. : : —




























































































emerged as professional organizations a very long time 
ago (Armstrong ). Their formation took place simultaneously 
with -and partly antedated- the consolidation of the 
modern state, that is during the period of mature absolutism 
and enlightened despotism and, to a larger degree, during 
the age of oligarchic liberalism. A tenable assumption, 
then, is that such dimensions as organizational format, 
division of work, professional socialization, institutional 
ideology, and so on, are still guided by the original 
historical matrix.
When the bureaucracies under discussion were 
organizationally rationalized and assumed the formal 
structure that, to a large extent, they still exhibit 
(late 19th Century), their functional load was relatively 
light and not very diversified. Basically, administrative 
activities were aimed at preserving law and order and 
regulating minor areas of social and economic life.
As was noted previously, a massive load of functions 
bearing upon direct socio-economic intervention has 
been assigned to the public sector in recent decades. 
This has caused administrative agencies to undergo a 
crisis of adaptation of old organizational models to 
new functional tasks
and exerts important consequences on the performance - 
of both the bureaucratic and the political systems.
According to the main argument advanced here, the 
above mentioned crisis only partially and marginally 
depends on the political attitudes of top-bureaucrats, 




























































































socio-economic activities that mass-democracies 
have assigned to the public sector. Rather, the most 
important conditions explaining the crisis of adaptation 
being discussed are represented by the organizational 
properties of the legal-rational model of bureaucracy 
(especially as observed in administrative law systems 
emerged and consolidated in the 19th Century), whose 
principles are largely incompatible with an effective 
intervention in the social and economic sectors.
As was observed previously, mass-democracies whose 
governments are directly concerned with social welfare 
and the management of the economy have altered radically 
the context of administrative action. And yet, the 
performance of the political system has grown more and 
more dependent upon the ability of the 19th Century 
bureaucracies to cope successfully, with such a new task 
domain. As a rule, and in varying degrees, this adaptive 
effort has not been satisfactory: the main reason for
this must be found in the fact that the administrative 
rationality of those bureaucracies, and the organizational 
and normative structures supporting it, were never meant 
to deal with social welfare and with managing the economy 





























































































4. Diachronic Conditions of Bureaucratic Performance.
In the preceding section attention has been called
to the fact that a professional public administration
emerged and was consolidated in Continental Europe in%
a period which antedates both the industrial and the 
liberal revolutions. This fact sets Continental political 
systems apart from other Western systems such as the
English one - where a professional civil service was
instituted toward the end of the 19th Century when both 
economic modernization and the constitutionalization 
of the polity had been accomplished - as well as the
United States - where the merit system became a widespread 
phenomenon in a context of mass democracy and advanced
industrialization.
This makes Continental bureaucracies much older 
than their Anglo-Saxon-counterparts and, as a consequence, 
the task of analyzing their structures and pinpointing 
their organizational properties is particularly complex. 
In fact, organizational forms and types have a history 
and such history determines some aspects of the structure 
and values of present organizations. In particular, 
careful attention should be paid to the notion that 
"the organizational "inventions" that can be made at 
a particular time in history depend on the social 
technology available at the time" (Stinchcombe: 155),
as well as on the cultural values and models definable 
as authoritative at that same time, and that; all tend ' 




























































































in the environment. To sum up, the main thrust
of the argument developed here is that present behavior 
and performance of public bureaucracies are affected 
by historically emerged structural and value-determinants.
What has been suggested so far does not, of course, 
imply a static rigidity of organizational models through 
time but, rather, as periodic reorganizations have 
occurred, the survival of older structural and value- 
features on which newer ones have been superimposed, 
so that a given concrete administrative structure or 
apparatus ends up by being characterized by a series 
of chronologically successive and organizationally 
overlapping features. The older an administrative system, 
the more numerous are these strata, and the more 
intermittent, latent, and difficult to pinpoint is their 
influence on present behaviour and performance.
The structural evolution of Continental administration 
spans three such strata: the preliberal and
preindustrial period (late absolutism) when the basic- 
structure of professional administration was laid out 
the liberal period (19th Century) when the rationalization 
of those structures was effected; and the post-liberal 
period (that of the welfare state and of public management 
of the economy) when these older structures have had 
to face an entirely new task domain (Freddi, 1982V. 
This - section has been constructed as an analytical 




























































































properties of Continental administration which respectively
proceed from the preliberai and liberal periods. Only
the conclusions immediately relevant to the argument
( 2 )unfolded here are set forth in this section. ' '
%4.1. The Constraints of the Preindustrial Period: Hierarchy 
and Generalism.
A term coined by those writers who tried to apply 
scientific management to public administration best 
summarizes the organizational properties of hierarchy 
and centralization as consolidated in absolutist 
administration and perpetuated to the present day: 
"generalism". Its ideal type can be outlined here, by 
stressing those structural traits of the classic
continental bureaucracies of today which were already 
clearly observable in the administrative apparatus of 
mature absolutism and enlightened despotism.
Candidates for administrative positions are selected 
on the basis of educational qualifications at a relatively 
young age, no previous practical training or work-experience 
being required of them. Entrance tests are largely 
designed to ascertain a certain degree of "cultural 
•literacy" rather than to assess and predict future
performance along specialist lines. Normally, organizational 
participants are expected to spend their entire working 
lives in the public service, nearly always- beginning *- 
at the bottom of the organizational ladder. Professional 




























































































relevant skills are learned on the job, after the 
selection process has taken place, and generationally 
transmitted to the newcomers, who are thus slowly and 
safely coopted to higher and higher positions. This 
peculiar form of recruitment is possibly the most fool 
-proof mechanism for institutionalized resistance against 
change ever conceived.
Organizational subunits, or offices, are ordered 
according to the principle of hierarchy; in the same 
fashion, incumbents of organizational roles are ordered 
according to a hierarchy of ranks to which differential 
degrees of material and psycological gratification are 
attached. Advancement along the career-ladder is 
competitive, and promotions are granted according to 
criteria which combine seniority, merit, and political 
"savvy"; in more general terms, what we observe is a 
system of extrinsic rewards administered by the hierarchy 
of authority (Thompson: 5).
This approach to work-performance and role-assigment 
best demonstrates the inherent properties of generalism: 
by this I mean that the European central administrative 
structures are staffed by individuals whose training, 
qualifications, aptitudes and, in general, professional 
orientation are assumed to be homogeneous. Participants, 
then are supposed to be capable of playing all organizational 
roles that are formally associated with a certain rank.
The organizational logic of such a structure does not 




























































































that permanently require functional specificity. On
the contrary, the system works on the assumption that
participants are omnicompetent vis-à-vis the different
functional spheres that can be distinguished within
the whole compass of governmental activity. Personnel*policies, in fact, are oriented toward individual 
rotations among several functional alternatives, and 
toward role interchangeability.
There is, however, another important structural 
characteristic: differentiation among participants takes
place only along the vertical dimension. This implies 
the assumption that although all functions performed 
by a given administrative structure share an identical 
generalist nature, they are, at the same time, characterized 
by increasing degrees of difficulty, and call for more 
expert and refined handling as one goes up the hierarchical 
ladder. Generalism -that is, the assumption of functional 
omnicompetence -geared to the vertical dimension of 
.ierarchy, leads to a second assumption: that of 
hierarchical omniscience (Thompson: 40-82; Crozier, 1963
213-269). In sum, these administrative institutions 
are characterized by a preoccupation with the monistic 
ideal (Barnard): administration is a monocratic institution 
articulated on a vertical sequence of superior - 
subordinate relationships in which the superior is the 
source of legitimate influence upon the subordinate.- 
The cultural definition of roles is autocratic and - 
authori tarian. The nexus between higier and lower •
participants is not mediated by considerations of - -




























































































it is based on a system of rights and duties.
There is, then, a confusion between the notion of 
right and that of ability, so that purely formal 
responsibility for something and competence to do something 
are assumed to coincide. It frequently follows that 
the greatest importance is attributed to supressing conflict, 
to avoiding a pluralistic orientation, and to preventing 
innovation.
As can be readily observed, many of the features 
of Max Weber's ideal type of bureaucracy are recognizable 
in this discussion, but not all. Notably, those that 
are found wanting concern the normative stance of legal- 
rational bureaucracy. This happens because, while the 
structural features of absolutist administration already 
incorporate, to a very large extent, the formal set­
up of contemporary Continental administration, the 
cbnception and management of authority-relationships
A Tis radically different. And the difference can be explained 
by the modifications introduced into or, better, layered 
over the administrative apparatus during the period 
of constitutional liberalism.
4.2. The Contraints of the Rechtsstaat: Legal Rationality.
Continental European constitutional liberalism, 
speaking in a very general way, took the form of the 
Rechtsstaat : order, certainty, predictablility, equality 
before the judge and the tax collector were the goals 
pursued by a bourgeoise that was aiming to avoid 
capriciousness, arbitrariness, and unreliability in 




























































































Europe tackled their tasks retaining the administrative
apparatus of the preliberal period practically unchanged
in its organizational structure: centralization, hierarchy,
andauthoritarianism,Aunresponsiveness remained its dominant 
characters.
Yet, against this largely unchanged set of structural 
features and value-premises, a set of new guiding principles, 
characterized by properties of their own, emerged to 
fit the old administrative machinery. The single most 
important such innovation was a meticulous, detailed, 
systematic, and explicit regulation of the administrative 
apparatus, extended to the relationships obtaining within 
such apparatus, to those between the apparatus and its 
political environment, and to those between administrative 
agencies and individual citizens. This complex regulation 
assumed the form and status of positive law and developed 
into a self-contained legislation, guided by rules of 
its own. A peculiarly European institution was thus 
born, i.e. , the system of public and administrative 
law, regulating the skewed and hierarchical relationships 
taking place within the compass of sovereignty, and 
sharply distinguished from the body of civil law, which 
regulates relationships entered into by legal equals.
The system of public and administrative law that 
emerged elaborated some central principles which define 
the relationship between bureaucracy and its socio-political 
environment - principles that characterize, so to speak, - 
the external "slope" of public administration. The more 
detailed principles that guide administrative action 




























































































value-premises, standards of behavior, organizational 
charts, rules of procedure (the combined impact of which 
results in what I call the organizational properties 
of the bureaucratic structure), can be seen as practical 
and operational applications of those central principles,
In the following pharagraphs and attempt is made 
succintly to characterize the central principles of - 
legal-rational administration; then a brief analysis 
of its more detailed and operational traits is set forth.
a) Administrative impartiality, i . e . , the 
idea that administrative action i_s politically neutral
(Gerber, Laband, ). The principle has exhibited,
and still exhibits, great vitality: legal doctrine still
treats it as an îs proposition; public opinion treats 
it at least as an ought to proposition; bureaucrats on 
the whole deem it to be relevantly descriptive of their 
role. Historically, this principle has been crucial 
in supporting legislation introducing job-security for 
civil servants, and in arguing that a professional 
bureaucracy can alternatively serve with equanimity 
political parties supporting different ideologies and 
sponsoring different programs and policies. ■ ; '
b) The purely executive role of public
administratione, i.e., the idea that the law - the
authoritative decisions formulated by political parties and the elective agencies expressed by political parties/- embodies per se the substance of administrative
action. Bureaucrats merely need apply logical deductions
to the law, and administrative decisions will ensue
from it automatically. In other words, we h'ave: There




























































































machine, as an instrument in the hands of its political master.
As was pointed out at the outset, modern political science
has shown both principles to be empirically untenable. Now there is
consensus in the literature on the fact that civil servants are
active in policy-making, enjoy a quasi-monopolistic control over■*
information, act to strengthen their already strong position by 
exercising discretionary controls over policy-execution, and 
engage in all these actions either representing their own values 
of sideing with fractional groups and views. Elsewhere I have 
discussed at some length the historical and epistemological con­
ditions that explain why the two principles emerged in 19th 
Century Continental Europe (Freddi, 1982). Here, it shall be suf­
ficient to outline them succinctly pointing out how, due to those 
conditions, the twin principles of administrative neutrality and 
instrumentality constitued valid and realistic descriptions of 
what was actually taking place: that is, public administration 
was, in fact, both neutral and instrumental. The Continental 
legal theorists who first formulated the theory of separation did 
so by abstracting and conceptualizing the basic trends of the 
administrative state that was then consolidating.
The (now mythical and then factual) principle of neutrality 
came forth from the following factors: (a) a political suffrage
limited to the upper middle classes; (b) a representative assembly 
seating well-to-do politicians basically agreed on fundamentals 
and free from head-on ideological combat; (c) a higher civil ser­
vice recruited from the same social strata from which those members 
of parliament who formed the ruling elite had also come (indeed, 
there was much horizontal mobility between the political establish­




























































































then, that such conditions of social, economic, and cultural 
homegeneity engendered a happy propensity to agree, and an 
excellent rapport between politics and administration that could 
correctly be described as administrative impartiality or neutral­
ity.
*
The factors behind the principle of administrative instrumentality 
are equally compelling: the period analyzed by the legal theorists 
is that of laissez faire economy. The state did not interfere in 
the workings of society and of the economy. It was a state of 
regulation, and not of intervention; a guarantor of order and a 
referee, not an activist agency. No wonder again that, to a large 
extent, the functions performed by public administration could 
correctly be described in logical-deductive terms, as a form of 
syllogism not dissimilar from that observed in the work of a judge 
acting as the interpreter of a codified system of law.
Thus, professional administrators performed their functions 
neutrally and instrumentally not because the law ordered them to 
do so, but thanks to the socio-political and economic circumstances 
that denoted the 19thCentury administrative state. The bureaucracy 
of that state had acquired .the nature of a servo-mechanism: it 
behaved, to use the metaphor coined by Herbert Kaufman, like an 
'internalized gyroscope'. Political parties and elected officials, 
in sum, could avail themselves of an administrative apparatus com­
parable to an efficient automation completely identified with the 
public goals then being pursued: as a consequence, our conditions 
for party government - control and problem solving capacity - were 
essentially met.




























































































political systems, notably mass democracy and the welfare state, 
have practically obliterated those conditions: on the one hand, no 
longer does one observe cultural, social and ideological homogeneity 
between civil servants and political personnel, and thus no longer 
can one maintain that bureaucracies are naturally representative of 
the political class (Kingsley, Subramaniam, Meier) and, hence, led 
to behave in a neutral fashion. On the other hand, the task domains 
which characterize the bureaucracy of the welfare state and of 
economic intervention cannot be satisfactorily performed via the 
deductive processes of legal-rational administration.
We should, nevertheless, take stock that the twin principles 
of neutrality and instrumentality still hold much sway and continue 
to be the backbone of the instititional ideology of legal-rational 
administration, with important operational implications. Indeed, 
the organizational design and the procedural rules of legal-rat­
ional bureaucracy should be interpreted as structures that give 
body and concreteness to those central principles.
The key-words used so far in characterizing the systematic 
goals of the Rechtsstaat are: certainty, predictability, relia­
bility. Moderate liberalism was bent on erecting a state where 
the abuses, the capriciousness, and the corruption of despotic 
rule should not occur. Public administration is that component 




























































































it is a system designed to insure maximum controllability.
The socio-economic stance of 19th Century regimes greatly 
reinforced the systemic values of the polity: "The best 
government is the government which governs least". The 
paramount goal is the avoidance, of undesiderable events 
- such as waste and abuse-not the furtherance of positive 
objectives. In sum, we have what has been called the 
"limited" or "negative" state.
The standard legal doctrine definition of control is veri 
flcation of whether a function has been performed . 
according to preestablished rules. Keeping in mind 
this definition as well as the basic value-premise whereby 
the government pursues negative and/or limited goals, 
the structural and functional characteristics of 19th 
Century legal-rational bureaucracy fall in place very 
neatly. Very sketchily, such characteristics can be 
outlined thus:
a) the administrative process - that series
of decisions and executions which begins with the
identification of a policy objective (the law) and
eventuates in the accomplishment of the same objective
is segmented according to a sequence of acts, issued 
individually by the several administrative subunits 
(ministries, boards, agencies, departments) Which-,'-'on 
the basis of their precisely defined competences, 
participate in the realization of the final goal'. --
b) each such subunit performs its task as 
if it were, so to speak, a monad. It guards jealously 
its own area of competence, and it is not expected, 




























































































the interests and sub-objectives which constitute the competence 
of other subunits. In other words, the institutional objective 
aimed for here can be characterized as the pursuit of account­
ability via the avoidance of organisational redundancy and the 
accentuation of formal controls.
*
c) the assumption is that administration is 
a self-propelling and self-contained machine. The logic 
of legal rationality calls for "each role to be perfected, 
each bureau to be exactly delimited, each linkage to 
articulate unfailingly, and to produce one interlocking 
system, one means-ends chain which possesses the absolutely 
minimum number of links, and which culminates at a central 
point" (Landau, 1969: 354).
(5) all these characteristics and traits are 
reinforced by the judicial and formalistic bent of mind 
of the civil servants, whose professional socialization 
is largely in the field of legal interpretation (Juristen 
Monopol).
To sum up: the impressive work of administrative
rationalization carried out in 19th Century Continental 
Europe ended up by fusing and enmeshing two fundamental 
organizational properties. The first - which, as we 
have seen, has both a preindustrial and preliberal matrix 
- is hierarchic centralization: superiors provide exact 
value premises to their subordinates who, accordingly,, 
do the same for their subordinates, and so forth. The 




























































































giving rise to the chain of command and compliance" 
(Landau; 1980: 199 ).
The second has reemphasized the drive for centralizing 
authority in order to anchor the legal - rational notion 
of accountability: it is based ,on the assumption that
it is possible to formulate unambigous value premises 
and precise goals which, in turn, lead to a "formal 
deductive system, synoptic in character, and entirely 
consistent". (Landau, 1980: 201 ).
Self-consistency, then, is the paramount value
in legal-rational bureaucracy, the core of its institutional
ideology. This engenders a circular process causing(1963)immobility in decision modes - what Crozier, has called
A
the "bureaucratic vicious circle" - for the performance 
standards and norms of behavior enforced by the formal 
organization derive from the values crystallized in 
the bureaucratic ideology.
This circular process not only induces decisional 
immobility, but also stability of performance criteria 
through time, regardless of external stimuli. As Blau 
has argued cogently (270-331), organizational ideology 
is supported by two factors: legitimating values and
the process of institutionalization. Legitimating values 
buttress authority, functioning as media of organization 
and thus extending the scope of organized control; they 
are enforced through the socialization of participants. 
Institutionalization, in turn, through a set of formalized 
procedures, perpetuates organizing principles and 




























































































via processes of organizational socialization.
These are the reasons which prompt and reinforce
the suggestion that studies of the political attitudes
of bureaucrats (the end-result of political socialization)
are not likely to shed much light on decision modes
*
and policy performance. Many more insights can be gained 
by concentrating on institutional, organizational, and 
professional socialization. And this is exactly why 





























































































5. Synchronie Conditions of Bureaucratic Performance:
Administrative Raionality or Administrative Rationalities?
What has been said so far does point indirectly to 
the fact that the task of public admi­
nistration is now not only quantitatively much larger, 
but qualitatively different. A formalistic, logical- 
deductive orientation to administrative decision-making 
was tenable in a context exclusively concerned with the 
maintenance of law and order. Now it has become a fiction.
A managerial aptitude rather then a judicial bent of mind 
is needed. When public agencies are concerned with social 
welfare, managing the economy, actually running large 
industrial concerns, top civil servants are daily confronted 
v/ith decision-situations of a pragmatic-inductive nature. 
Cost-benefit considerations, choices between technically 
alternative solutions nearly always leading to different 
political consequences, bargaining with clienteles and 
special constituencies are but a few examples of situations 
likely to occur in the normal course of administrative 
activity. No matter how detailed, well framed, and.up- 
to-the-point legislation may be, it certainly cannot provide 
concrete guidance to solve such complex problems.
Two immediate consequences can briefly be indicated, 
here: on the one hand, the more "modern" functions of
the state have made it inevitable for the higher civil 
servants to play a central role in actual policy making.
On the other hand, the persistence through time of: the 
fiction whereby what the civil service does. :is merely 
instrumental execution of what political parties and elected . . 




























































































creates a smoke-screen which keeps the level of awareness 
of what actually happens very low, and hence reduces the 
probability that relevant and indispensable controls be 
effectively exercised.
■%
The search for a streamlined predictability and 
reliability of administrative processes had been prompted 
by essentially negative considerations: in other words,
they can be construed as an expedient contrived to prevent 
abuses, waste, and corruption. Legality, not flexibility, 
systemic maintenance, not operational effectiveness, had 
been the objectives. Within these limitations, the design 
had been successful.
Under modern conditions, however, the reverse is 
true. The series of bottlenecks designed in the 19th Century 
have now become strangleholds on the-20th Century functions. 
Delays, inability to adapt, failure to spend allocated 
moneys before the planned deadlines, ritualisms, buck­
passing, and displacement of goals are some of the results.
The conclusion of all this is then obvious: legal-
rational buraucracies are not compatible with the functions 
of the welfare state and of governments concerned with 
managing the economy. Both administrative value-premises 
and organizational techniques must be radically overhauled 
if a new compatibility between administrative structure 




























































































In order to put in perspective the requirements of
an interventionist administration operating in a democratic
context, and such to augment the probability tha't the
party government model and its prerequisites be realized,
an investigation of the organizational properties that such an administration/ought to possess is indispensable: and this is best done 
by contrasting them with the properties of legal-rational 
bureaucracy. At the outset, and painting with a broad 
brush, one must point out that the limited, negative state 
of the ISth Century performed authoritative functions 
mediated by the attributes of certainty and predictability: 
on the other hand, the interventionist and pluralist state 
of our days deals with uncertain and problematical 
situations and it does so allegedly guided bu criteria 
of effectiveness and responsiveness.
Now, if the functional load of contemporary Western 
European governments is characterized by situations that 
are both uncertain and problematical, it follows that  ̂
all policies, by their nature, lie in the future tense 
and are, therefore, hypothetical (Landau, 1973 and 1980).^  
Their results then, can be defined as outcomes on a test, of
adequacy of policy, whichyfike saying that policies are sol­
utions to problems./ If a policy fails to produce the specified outcome,' - ■ 
this may arise because:
a) it is simply an incorrect hypothesis - ; ’*•
b) it has not been executed properly - i.e., its implementation 
is weak, which means that in its initial formulation,
it was incomplete -
c) it was misinterpreted, which means that those'charged ■ '• '■ •
with its execution, changed it, either unintentionally ----* 




























































































In almost every area of the governmental scope of 
action, therefore, we observe a competition of solutions 
with respect to a given situational problem. This is why 
we quite often absorve heated and vigorous debates on 
all sorts of policy issues. In only one area of policy 
rarely, if ever, do we have explicit discussion: in the
area of organizational policy. It would seem that, in 
most cases, the heroic assumption of Taylorism is made where­
by'. the one best way to organize is known.
That there can be, or must be, different organizational 
structures for different types of problem situations, escapes 
notice. The basic form (emerged in absolutist Europe and 
explicitly rationalized and politically tamed in the 19th 
Century) remains virtually universal: the hierarchic
pyramid, generalism, the twin myths of functional omnicompetence 
and of hierarchic omniscience, the search for predictability 
and certainty. There are variations on the theme, but 
they are usually minor. The fundamental (legal-retional, . 
Weberian) assumption remains that all we need in order to make a 
correct decision in the single case is logical deduction 
from the law.
Since, as was affirmed above, policies are hypotheses, 
organizations which either make and/or administer policy 
must be sensitive and must respond to error. A central 
concept must be emphasized here: that contemporary bureaucracies 
deal in knowledge, that their work is empirical and 
experimental, end that it has been made thus by governmental 




























































































activities are not any longer simply matters of law; they 
are also, and predominantly, matters of fact. If bureaucracies 
are not organically aware of this, and are then organized 
so as to preclude appreciation of fact, they are, as a 
consequence, incapable of detecting error (Landau, 1973 
and 1980; Wildavsky, 1972). %
Let us go back to the notion whereby all organizations
are systems of knowledge. Presuntively, the knowledge
necessary (i. e., of technical instrumentation and cause-
effect relations) is contained in an organizational structure:
in the law which "structures" it, and in its rules andwhich, according to the perspective developed here 
regulations must be viewed as decision rules -
rules which provide solutions to problems. An organization
design is therefore an empirical claim, namely that its
structure contains the knowledge necessary to accomplish
its tasks.
If we conceive of the organizational structure as ** 
a body of knowledge, then its operational outcomes are 
a function of that knowledge. If an organization had been 
constituted with perfect knowledge, it would mean that 
it would never be surprised: save for the equivalent of 
measurement errors, everything would proceed as expected, 
and nothing wold be problematical. Thus, surprise, deviation 
from expectation, anomaly mean that the organization has
less than perfect knowledge (Landau, 1980) , and that, as a : 
consequence, ,an error has been made. .
In a well-run organization, the appearance of' error • -■ •




























































































Steps are then taken to find a correction. Constant 
corrections mean that an organization is continually mo­
difying structure so as to reduce the probability of 
error. When this occurs over long periods of time, the 
organization takes on the properties of its task environmment 
and ceases to rensemble its original structure. If, in 
fact, an organizational system created a very long time 
ago (as in the case of many branches of Continental administr­
ation) retains its basic original structural features, 
it either has had perfect knowledge (wich is impossible) 
or it has not learned very much from experience.
Returning to a quotation from Landau (1980:207) "a perfect
theknowledge system takes^form of an abstract calculus. As
in classical mechanics, it is hierarchical and pyramidal,
asymmetrical and transitive". Through processes of logical
deduction, one moves down the logical chain. If the system
is pureley formal, it has no empirical content: therefore,
a perfection can be attained. It is, however, a formal
or logical perfection. If, on the contrary, it has
empirical content, then deductions must be tested -
verified or falsified. The greater the power of the system,
the less the probability of surprise: the less - the
probability of surprise, the less the error. In other •occur that arewords, events occur as predicted. If outcomes y  unexpected, 
the system is immediately re-examined for error and save 
for measurement or test error, they are corrected.
As was shown in the previos sections, virtually 
all classical bureaucracies exhibit the form of-this kind- 
of knowledge system: they are pyramidal, hièrarchicâl,-
and therefore asymmetrical and transitive. A structûrè: : .




























































































assume that near perfect knowledge is in hand and,'
universally, this is a case of institutionali-zed self-
deception (Landau, 1980). Bureaucracies in general,
bureaucracies involved in social and economic intervention
in particular, simply cannot be characterized by such
a type of knowledge. So long as they maintain this fiction,*
then their procedures, rules, and regulations are purely 
formal, devoid of empirical power, and problem solving 
capacity. Consistency, - as was noted in section 4.2 - 
becomes their modal pattern of operations, regardless 
of stimulus, and thus we observe mechanical rule following 
and displacement of goals.
All that has been said in the last few paragraphs 
impinges on the notion of administrative rationality; 
and it leads to a conclusion: in the same way that it
is incorrect to assume the existence of one best way to 
organize, so it is equally incorrect to assume that there 
is one best administrative rationality.
It is, therefore, important to distinguish among 
types of rationality, so as to avoid the risk of 
concentrating all the attention on just one definition, 
such as that of legal rationality, or on that close relative, 
the rationality of efficiency, as defined by the economists 
of the neo-classical persuasion, and generally -cast • in 
terms of input-output ratios (Buchanan and Tollison,'1972 ; -• 
Downs, 1967; Niskanen, 1971; Bréton, 1974; Tullock, Î963J • 
Peacock, 1979). As we shall see shortly, we may as well 
speak of the rationality of effectiveness, defined as 




























































































may, under conditions of conflict, speak of the rationality 
of acceptability. (Lindblom. March and Olsen. Wildavskÿ, I960) 
What is necessary at this point is to make clear that 
rationality is a systemically bounded concept: what is
rational in one circumstance is irrational in another.
The importance of this fact has particularly to do
with the concept of legal rationality cast mostly in terms«
of certainty, consistency, predictability, reliability, 
syllogistic logicality, (and which, as we have seen, is 
frequently assumed to be the only type of modern rationality). 
Now, legal rationality must be understood in a twofold 
perspec
in contrast to tradition and charisma: it refers to a 
set of behavioral constraints that differ from the latter.
And its main point is not just directed (as the ideology 
of the Rechtsstaat would have us to believe) against 
arbitrary action by governmental authorities, for there 
is little that is arbitrary in traditional, precedent- 
bound systems. Rather, and most importantly, legal 
rationality has to be understood in terms of providing 
an objective basis or standard of justification for actions 
taken by bureaucrats. Hence the establishment of sets 
of rules and regulations that are technically warranted. 
Technical warrants, however, are not synonimous with 
efficiency and certainty (the objectives predominantly 
pursued by legal rational administration). They can also - 
be based on criteria of effectiveness and criteria of 
acceptability. '.
Distinguishing rationalities relates directly to 
distinguishing decisions. In raising the question of 
organizational policy, the point is that different situations




























































































are different precisely because their modal patterns of
decision differ. Hence, for different types of situations,
we need organizational structures that permit the most
"rational" types of decisions. What is required now is
to establish a typology of decisions as clearly as we
%can so that each subset is easily identifiable.
(1947 and 1960)
The seminal contributions of Simon/are, of course, 
crucially important in this respect. As is well known, 
Simon characterizes an administrative decision in a 
modernized and secularized context as a function of both 
fact and value. In traditional and sacred contexts, one 
can find examples of decisional situations which do not 
admit of fact as a legitimating "basis for decisions. There, 
a factual challenge is perceived as deviation from dogma, 
and as deserving suppression and sanction.
This peculiarity, however, is not limited to traditional 
and presecular societies only. In fact - as me have seen- 
Western bureaucracies too can take on this property, when, 
e, g. , they root themselves in decision-rules which have 
become a dogma (certainty, legality) and, therefore, guard 
against challenges of fact. Needless to say, organizations 
which exhibit these modes of decision are incapable of 
detecting error and of effecting corrections# and thus are 
ill-fitted to cope with the task domains introduced by pub­
lic intervention into society and in the economy.
A modern, technically based organization should exhibit 
quite different characteristics: it should not preclude value 
judgements while simultaneously, employing factual warrants in 
establishing and justifying its decisions. -Dogma should have 




























































































system, only error. Error would signal the need for 
correction and an organizatin built on this principle 
should devote considerable amounts of its resources to 
the task of correction.
(4 )
Keeping in mind that three types of administrative 
rationality have been distinguished (efficiency and/or 
certainty, effectiveness, and acceptability), and using 
Simon's basic formulation, we can now establish a decision 

























On the F axis, Facts are to be understood in terms of know­
ledge of cause-effect relations, of instrumentation, of pro­
cess laws: in a more directly administrative language, they 
refer to organizational means. Were a + appears, the know­
ledge necessary to achieve a goal exists. Otherwise, it 
does not: organizational means are inadequate to the task.
On the V axis, Values are to be understood as motivational, 
as setting up drive-states or predispositions which give 
rise to organizational goals. A + means the goal consensus 
exists: there is agreement and organizational goals have 
been unambiguously defined. A - means lack of agreement 




























































































This discussion of alternative operational definitions
of administrative rationality can be concluded with a
few interpretative comments about the 'figure presented
%at p. 48 . Cell A accommodates legal-rational bureaucracy(5)
as well as the rationality of efficiency : it is the locus 
where decisions of a logical-deductive nature are made, 
whose validity is a function of the system of norms and 
/or parameters from which they issue. Their cornerstone 
is codified law. When quite some time after the administrative 
structures having these properties had been erected, 
governments began to intervene in the social and economic 
sectors, an important phenomenon became evident.
Many of the new task-domains and decisional situations ' thuswhich were/(assigned to public administration are characterized 
by internal logics of their own, be they those of economics, 
of technology, of social welfare. What they have in common 
is a high empirical content, which means that satisfactory 



























































































and repeated testing (Cf. cell C). The point is well
illustrated, from different angles, by such anthors as
Lindblom, Allison, March & Olsen. In.sum, policies have
acquired here the nature of hypotheses and the bureaucrats
who had been trained to think of themselves as deductive
logicians had to tackle problems usually faced by empirical%
technicians.
At the same time, governments began more and more 
frequently to act as brokers, mediators, articulators, 
trying to process the diverse and contradictory demands
issuing from pluralistic and mass-democratic societies. 
(This is the case of cell B). The degree of authoritativeness 
of governmental action decreased markedly.
Traditional uberparteilich civil servants were faced with 
the task of advocacy, calling for political responsiveness 
and aptitude for compromise.
In some political systems new structures, both 
administrative and normative, were erected to deal with 
the new functions. In other political systems, notably 
those with entrenched and powerful legal-rational 
bureaucracies, the opposite trend was observed: the new
functions were forced into the old structures. The 
decisional situations located in cells B and C, were treated 




























































































Management- that is the approach to decision-making 
that best sums up the contents of cells B and C -was 
equated with control, an approach perfectly suited to 
the decisional situations described in cell A. Unfortunately, 
management and control are terms inversely related to 
each other. If a situation can be controlled, it means 
that it is not problematical. The assumption that problematical 
situations can be controlled has led to the lamentable 
situations that have been illustrated in the first pages 
of this paper: management problems that are overwhelmed
by premature, programming and premature control systems.
To sum u d : administrative institutions cast in the 
legal-rational mold "tend (statistically speaking) to commit 





























































































6. Party Governement and Bureaucratic Effectiveness and 
Responsiveness: A Framerwork for Comparative Analysis.
As was stated at the outset, two conditions must
exist for the model°*party governement to be realized:
control over the bureaucracy- by elected officials andor, at least acceptable an administration capable of a satisfactory^policy performance.
The discussion developed thus far has shown that 
in order for these conditions to obtain, bureaucracy must 
be denoted by the two characteristics of responsiveness 
(defined as readiness to pursue policy-goals in accord 
with the values prevailing in the political system), and 
of effectiveness (defined as a satisfactory or acceptable 
ratio of expected outcomes to actual outcomes).
Historically, two alternative strategies have been 
employed to bring about those desirable characteristics: 
on the one hand, the American spoils system which,while 
bestowing on elected officials a capacity of total control 
over the bureaucracy, led to disastrous consequences in 
terms of effectiveness - let alone graft and corruption 
- and prompted Wilson to suggest that the American system 
of government, if it wanted to become effective, would 
have needed to create an administrative system modeled 
after that of the Emperor of Gerrtiany. On the other hand, 
a politically neutral and technically competent civil . 
service, that is legal-rational bureaucracy (by and large, 
the above mentioned administration of the Emperor of 
Germany).




























































































has been devoted both to the socio-political characteristics 
of European civil servants of the late 19th and very early 
20th centuries, and to the organitional properties of 
European bureaucracies during the same period.
So far as the socio-political characteristics of 
the civil service are concerned, we have seen that, for 
reasons both cultural and sociological, higher civil
rservants tended to be attitudinally homogeneaus vis-à- 
vis elected officials. This happy coincidence made for 
continous decisional processes between the political and 
administrative classes, so that the latter performed pretty 
much like an automatic servo-mechanism (hence the idea 
of neutrali ty).
At the same time, the organizational properties of 
the bureaucratic apparatus proved to be admirably fitted
i
to the task domains of the administration of the limited 
or negative state of law and order and of laissez faire. 
They were made obsolete and/or insufficient when the task 
domain of the bureaucracy came to include interventionist 
policies. Here the central point concerns modes of 
decision-making. More specifically, the argument was 
developed in the' following manner: a) administrative
rationality, that is the mold of decision-making, is the 
function and product of organizational structure and 
procedural norms; b) different functional task domains 
call for different decision modes, which will obtain only- 
in the context of an appropriate administrative rationality; 
c) satisfactory performance is a function of a positive 
correlation between task domains and administrative 




























































































1) legal rationality, conducive to synoptic, sillogistic 
and deductive processes leading to authoritative decisions 
in a context where goals are unambigously defined and 
means are fully adequate;
2) the rationality of intervention, involving incremental*
and pragmatic processes, leading to effective decisions, 
(provided that the adequacy of organizational means is 
constantly tested empirically);
3) the rationality of advocacy of, and/or intermediation 
among interests, involving processes of bargaining and 
negotiation, conducive to acceptable decisions whose main 
objective is the clarification of ambigous and uncertain 
goals.
It was argued, then, that the unsatisfactory policy 
performance plaguing contemporary political systems stems 
from the fact that both the functions of intervention 
and those of intermediation have been forced into the 
mold of legal rationality - assumed as the only and one 
best way to make decisions - while the task of erecting 
administrative structures captable of accomodating alternative 
rationalities has frequently been neglected, though to 
varying degrees in different political systems. The 
consequences of this situation have been described: 
ritualism, rule - following, formalism, premature planning, 
all leadingto the conclusion that "a bureaucratic organization 
cannot correct its behaviour by learning from its
not only ineffective, 'but unresponsive as well, fo~r the 
relevant knowlec^ to run it has become a monopoly of its 
participants, less and less controllable by its alleged 
political masters. -




























































































The argument developed in this essay, and particularly 
in section 5, is that the task domain of the modern state 
has caused accepted notions of bureaucratic respansiveness 
and policy performance (derived from the ISth century 
conceptions of neutrality and instrumentality) to become 
obsolete; and that they can be rendered adequate to the 
complex task domains of our times by incorporating and 
appropriately structuring the forms of rationality outlined 
in our decision matrix. The main hypothesis here is that 
to the extent that an administrative structure is capable 
of incorporating the "modern" rationalities, the probability 
will increase that the basic conditions of party government 
be approximated.
How could one propose to test this hypothesis? By 
starting from the observation that the structural features 
of the bureaucracies of different political systems are 
different and by investigating which structural features 
are more likely either to incorporate those forms of 
administrative rationality that are associated with an 
effective policy performance, or to facilitate those 
processes of socialization that are associated with 
bureaucratic respo-nsiveness.
As was noted previously, responsiveness and effectivenes, 
though they are closely linked, are not in a unilinear 
relationship: neither could be predicted from the other. 
Responsiveness is, to a sometimes large extent, a function 
of attitudes and sociological factors which antecede 
processes of institutional socialization, whereas effectiveness 




























































































socialization. Thus, responsiveness ought to be gauged 
with indicators sensitive not only to structural variables, 
but to attitudinal and exo-organizational variables as 
well.
On the basis, then, of the argument developed so 
far, a framework for comparative classification and analysis 
can be constructed. Its aim is the assesment of the extent 
to which two dependent variables (the conditions of 
realizability of the party government model) are affected 
by a set of independent variables. The two dependent 
variables are: effectiveness of policy performance (or 
problem solving capacity) and bureaucratic responsiveness 
(which obtains when the bureaucracy exerts a power which 
is neither independent from nor uncontrolled by elected 
officials)
A tentative checklist of independent variables is
r
presented here. Some are of a structural nature, and some 
are attitudinal. They are displayed as continua. The 
hypothesis formulated here is that the trends implicit 
in the captions itemized in the left hand column are 
associated with both low effectiveness and low responsiveness, 
pointing to modes of decision of oligarchic legal-rational 
bureaucracies, whereas the captions that can be read in 
the right- hand column indicate trends associated with 
high effectiveness (the first four) and high responsiveness
/ \  ' ".  - V(the last three), pointing to modes of decision that 
































































































4. Monopoly of knowledge (e.g.,
5. Bureaucratic ethos (localism)
6. Socio-political particularism


































































































































































































A few conclusive comments will hopefully clarify the impli­
cations of this framework for comparative analysis. Hierarchic 
centralization typifies those administrations where nearly all 
decisions, both substantive and instrumental, are made by small 
and highly cohesive groups of officials, with no leeway left to 
intermediate executives. Here the possibility of experimental and 
pragmatic feedbacks is minimal, and self-corrections are slow and
rarely resorted to, as in the French case (Crozier, 1963) and, as 
putwas pointed^/by the Fulton Report, in the British case as well.
In such situations, moreover, the probability is high that an 
unsatisfactory distinction be made between policy-making and policy- 
execution, with negative consequences both on efficiency and on the 
ability of cabinet ministers to effectively control administrative 
action. Both the American situation, where one sees ample decisional 
powers granted to the men on the spot (Corson and Paul), and the 
West German experience (Mayntz and Scharpf. Mayntz), where the 
Lander do over 90 per cent of the administrative work, with the 
central government departments engaged with the larger questions 
of policy, illustrate the opposite trend.
The notions of structural diffusion and generalism (as contrasted 
with structural differentiation and functional specificity) were 
discussed in detail in Section 3: among the largest Western poli­
tical systems, Italy and Britain seem to score lowest on these 
dimensions with, however, an important difference: Italian officials, 
being nearly all trained in the law, exasperate ritualism and prem­
ature programming, while the members of the administrative class 
are much more flexible and adaptable, moving frequently, as they do, 
among the great departments and having been chosen for qualities of 




























































































American and the French case exemplify, even though in different 
ways, the opposite tendency: 'in both systems, administrative leaders 
are the carriers of diversified types of relevant talents. They 
are professional specialists and thus are capable of bringing dif­
ferent and necessary perspectives to bear upon decision-making 
(Corson and Paul. Suleiman, 1978).
The next two variables (monopoly of knowledge vs. pluralistic 
knowledge, and bureaucratic ethos vs. outside reference groups) 
illustrate mutually reinforcing dimensions. The potential of a 
monopolistic control over the relevant knowledge to run the bureau­
cracy is typical - as Weber observed - of legal-rational administr­
ation. In the Italian case and, to a somewhat lesser extent, in 
the German case, higher civil servants are the stern custodians and 
the formalistic interpreters of legal rules used as standards for 
decision and evaluation, practically reducing to nil the possibility 
of intelligent scrutiny by outsiders. The opposite applies where 
different technical and professional outlooks are observed: there, 
as in the American case (Aberbach et al.) and, to a less intense 
degree, in France (Suleiman, 1974), one looks at a veritable market 
place of options and counteroptions, where decisions are reached 
via confrontation of alternative policy solutions. In turn, where 
a monoply of knowledge obtains, we tend to observe also the parti­
cular form of secrecy and social cohesion referred to as bureau­
cratic ethos, characterized by localism, or unilateral identific­
ation with the traditional values of the institution (Merton.
Gouldner). Where, on the contrary, civil servants are prevalently 
guided by professional values, active not only in bureaucracy, but 
also in the societal environment; where, in orther words, we have 




























































































outside the bureacracy, the probability will be higher that 
effective controls be exercised and access to the administration 
be granted more easily to concerned individuals and interest 
groups.
The last two variables (socio,-political particularism vs. 
representativeness, and attitudes incongruent vs. congruent with 
the political system's values) are those which have constituted, 
so far, the main concern of behavioral studies investigationg the 
motivational factors of administrative action. Where the bureau­
cracy as a social group is incapable of representing either society 
or the political class - the notable case here is France (Suleiman, 
1978) and, to a lesser degree Italy (Aberbach et al. Putnam) - the 
likelihood is great that the higher civil service is a semiauton- 
omous and unresponsive (to party government) political agency 
(Suleiman, 1974), whereas the opposite is true where a good fit 
exists between administrators and politicians, as in Britain 
(Kingsley) or between bureaucracy and society as in the United 
States (Bendix. Aberbach et al.). (7)
In conclusion, the dimensions listed on the left hand column 
constitute the main headings of an ideal type of bureaucracy which 
is both incapable of tackling the task domains of contemporary pol­
itical systems, and undermines the possibility of effective party 
government. By contrast, those dimensions that are listed in the 
right hand column illustrate a totally alternative ideal type.
Mutatis mutandis, an administration thus characterized would recreate 
the conditions that we have seen to have obtained in 19th Century 
Europe: the bureaucracy would act largely like an automatic servo­




























































































task domains and the values prevailing in the political environ­
ment. Party government would be in effective, not nominal, control 
and, in the context of this updated version of the policy-admini­
stration dichotomy, could count on an instrument capable of pro­




























































































Aaron Wildavsky (1972), in discussing some organizational trends 
recently surfaced in several Western political systems, has also sug­
gested that we might be moving toward a rehabilitation of the policy- 
administration dichotomy.
(2 )This essay is not concerned with a discussion and an evaluation 
of the problems encountered when defining and analyzing the concept 
of political performance, but only with a particular moment or dimension 
of it, and namely policy performance which, in the structural approach 
adopted here, is relatively simple to isolate. For a discussion of 
the multifaceted problems and dimensions one encounters in defining 
political performance, cf. Eckstein (1972).
For a more articulated and detailed discussion cf. Freddi (1982).
( 4 ) For the arguments developed in this section I am much indebted to 
Martin Landau: not only to his published work, but also to the many 
stimulations I have received discussing with him. However, I do apply 
or develop some of his concepts to situations and according to criteria 
that are quite different from those encountered in his work, and that 
he might not approve of. Thus, the responsibility for such applications 




it is not a coincidence that in the technical jargon of 
jurists, legal doctrine is sometimes referred to as "dog-
Placing these two concepts (legal rationality and the rationality 
of efficiency) under the same label might cause some surprise in view 
of their largely separate histories in the literature. The impression, 
though, is likely to vanish if we concentrate our attention on the orga­
nizational properties which are associated with the types of rationality 



























































































between Weberian legal rationality and the underpinnings of the Scienti­
fic Management school, cf. March, Simon, and Guetzkow.
This framework is partially grounded on a conceptualization presented 
in my earlier work (Freddi, 1968) developed, however, solely on the basis 
of an analysis of structural traits of bureaucratic institutions, and not 
of historically explained organizational properties.
(8)The comments briefly developed here are impressionistic and merely
pretend to exemplify possible lines of research. Neither the empirical 
referents that have been mentioned nor the literature that has been 
cited could be described as even remotely comprehensive.
Continuing in the same tentative and sketchy vein, a classification 
of the bureaucracies operating in the largest Western political systems 
might look as follows: the Italian bureaucracy would score low (or lowest) 
on all seven variables, whereas American administration would be located 
at the opposite end. The French system would score low on variables 1,
5, 6 and 7 and rather high on the others. The German system would score 
high on 1, 2, 6 and 7, low on 3, 4 and 5. The'British system would score 
low on 1 and 3, somewhere at the middle on 4 and 5, and high on the others.
In conclusion, the American bureaucracy would corrC out as the one most 
approximating the conditions of control by elected officials and of accep­
table problem solution capacity .It is the most fragile bureaucracy in 
terms of its probability of enjoying autonomous power and, at the same 
time, the most flexible and adaptable from an institutional point of view, 
having been capable of incorporating the professional talents and technical 
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